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Traxler: Barbe v. McBride
BARBE V. MCBRIDE

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment sets forth that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." 1 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the Confrontation Clause to provide defendants with the right to cross-examine
the witnesses against them.2 The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is
essential to providing criminal defendants with a fair trial.3 However, exercising
this right often comes into conflict with rape shield statutes designed to protect
victims of sexual abuse from further humiliation and anguish. 4 This conflict puts
courts in the conundrum of deciding which interest outweighs the other: the
defendant's interest in being able to cross-examine witnesses to put forth an
effective defense or the State's interest in protecting victims of sexual abuse and
encouraging them to bring their claims. It is in this context that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently decided Barbe v. McBride.5 In
an attempt to provide a fair and workable standard for courts to use in dealing
with this conflict, the Fourth Circuit forbid per se exclusion of evidence of a
victim' s prior sexual abuse and instead set forth a number of factors for courts to
consider on
a case-by-case basis when determining the admissibility of such
6
evidence.
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Barbe, the United States Supreme
Court had established that per se exclusion of evidence under a rape shield
statute is constitutionally impermissible. 7 In Rock v. Arkansas,8 decided in 1987,
the Supreme Court reversed an Arkansas court's decision that excluded as
unreliable all of a defendant's hypnotically induced testimony. 9 The Court found
that the trial court's ruling excluding the testimony violated the defendant's
constitutional right to testify. 10 Specifically, while restrictions on such testimony
are permissible, the Court declared that a per se exclusionary rule that disallows
all hypnotic testimony is unconstitutional.1 1 The Court held that any restrictions
a state places on a defendant's right to testify cannot be per se exclusions, and
the restrictions "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve." 12 In Michigan v. Lucas,13 the Court extended this holding to

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

2.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
3.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1991) (observing that Michigan's
rape shield statute "unquestionably implicates the Sixth Amendment").
5.
521 F.3d 443,449 (4th Cir. 2008).
6.
Id. at 458.
7.
Id. (citing Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153).
8.
483 U.S. 44 (1987).
9.
Id. at 61-62.
10. Id. at 62.
11. Id.at61-62.
12. Id. at 55-56.
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situations involving the Confrontation Clause and rape shield statutes,
proclaiming that "[r]estrictions on a criminal defendant's right[] to confront
adverse witnesses... 'may not be,14
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.
Consequently, these two decisions morphed into
the "Rock-Lucas Principle," which disallows per se exclusions of15evidence under
a rape shield statute and instead requires a case-by-case analysis.
Adopting the Supreme Court's framework, the Fourth Circuit has warned
that courts should use the Rock and Lucas decisions when determining whether
to exclude a defendant's line of questioning under a rape shield statute. 16 The
Fourth Circuit added teeth to this warning in Barbe v. McBride. In Barbe,
decided on April 7, 2008, the Fourth Circuit found that a West Virginia court
violated a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him when, based on
a rape shield statute, it prohibited the defendant from cross-examining an expert
witness on the possibility that sexual abuse by other men caused the victim's
psychological profile. 17
The State of West Virginia charged the defendant, Donald Barbe, with
committing various sexual offenses against three victims. The charges against
Barbe for one of the victims, whom the court referred to as "J.M.," included
"three counts of sexual assault, three counts of incest, and three counts of sexual
abuse by a custodian." 19 Despite having previously asserted that the defendant
never sexually abused her, J.M. testified at trial that Barbe had sexually abused
her continuously from when she was four until she was twelve. 20 To support
J.M.'s claims, the State introduced expert testimony by a licensed clinical
counselor. 21 The expert testified that, in her opinion, J.M. had been sexually
abused as a child because J.M. fit the psychological profile for post-traumatic
stress disorder. 22 This created the inference that the defendant had sexually
abused her.23 On cross-examination, the defense counsel questioned the expert
about the possibility that sexual abuse by other men could explain the same
psychological profile. In fact, the defense counsel had witnesses prepared to

13. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
14. Id. at 151 (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56).
15. See Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 456-57 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Lucas, 500 U.S. at
148-49, 151; Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56.).
16. See Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 848-50 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
established an analytical framework that courts should use when evaluating Confrontation Clause
challenges based upon the exclusion of evidence. Pursuant to this framework, courts must determine
whether the rule relied upon for the exclusion of evidence is 'arbitrary or disproportionate' to the
'State's legitimate interests."' (quoting Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151)).
17. Barbe, 521 F.3d at 443, 445, 448.
18. Id. at 446.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 459-60.
24. Id. at 446.
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testify that J.M. had previously accused other men of sexual abuse. 25 The
defense counsel intended
to show that
,
26 abuse by other men, not by the defendant,
caused J.M.'s psychological profile. However, before the expert could respond,
the State objected on the ground that West Virginia's rape shield statute
"precluded... questioning the... expert about J.M.'s alleged sexual abuse by
other men., 27 The defense counsel argued that the defendant would not be able
to receive a fair trial if he could not cross-examine the expert witness on other
possible explanations for the victim's psychological profile.
The trial judge sustained the State's objection, ruling that West Virginia's
rape shield statute prohibited the line of questioning concerning other sexual
abuse. 29 The relevant portion of West Virginia's rape shield statute reads as
follows:
In any prosecution under this article [for a sexual offense] evidence of
specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than
the defendant, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and
reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be
admissible: Provided, That such evidence shall be admissible solely for
the purposes of impeaching credibility, if the victim first makes his or
her previous sexual conduct
an issue in the trial by introducing evidence
30
with respect thereto.
Previously, in State v. Quinn, 31 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia established a falsity exception to the rape shield statute. 32 Before this
exception allows a defendant to introduce any evidence of previous allegations
of sexual abuse by the victim, the defendant must show the trial judge, without
the jury present, that "there is a strong probability" that the previous allegations
were false. 33 Relying on Quinn, the trial court in Barbe ruled that because the
defendant was unable to show that the victim's previous allegations of sexual
abuse were false, he could not introduce the evidence under the falsity
exception. 34 Because the defendant did not meet the falsity exception, the trial
court held that "the rape shield statute applies, period., 35 Furthermore, the trial
36
court refused to acknowledge any other exception to the rape shield statute.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
W. VA. CODE § 61-8B- 11(b) (1976).
490 S.E.2d 34 (W. Va. 1997).
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Barbe, 521 F.3d at 448.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. n.8.
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Thus, the defense counsel was unable to cross-examine the expert on the
possibility that sexual abuse by someone other than the defendant caused the
victim' s psychological profile.
The jury found the defendant guilty of six of the nine sexual assault charges
pertaining to J.M. 38 He appealed the trial court's rape shield ruling to the
39
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, but the court denied his petition.
He then filed petitions for habeas corpus in both West Virginia and federal
courts. In these petitions, the defendant argued that the trial court's rulings
violated his Sixth Amendment rights to effective counsel and to confront the
witnesses against him.4 1 The state courts denied his petitions. 42 At the federal
level, the district court adopted a magistrate's recommendation to dismiss the
case with prejudice but granted the defendant's certificate of appealability
because the issues "could ... be deemed debatable by reasonable jurists." 43 The
case presented two issues to the Fourth Circuit: (1) whether the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel had been violated and (2) whether the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his witnesses had been
violated. 44
With respect to the first issue, the Fourth Circuit quickly affirmed that the
45
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel had not been violated.
In the district court, the defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for
"fail[ing] to procure an expert witness, fail[ing] to object to the testimony
• ,,46
of... similar act witnesses, and fail[ing] to adequately prepare for trial. The
district court applied a Strickland v. Washington47 analysis, which requires the
defendant to show "that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 48 The Fourth Circuit agreed that
the defendant did not satisfy either prong of the Strickland
test and accordingly
49
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the issue.
With respect to the second issue, however, the Fourth Circuit more
thoroughly analyzed whether the trial court's rulings violated the defendant's
right to confront the witnesses against him.5 Because the appeal involved denial
of habeas relief by the federal district court, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the state

37. Id. at 448.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 448-49.
41. Id. at449-51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at451.
44. Id. at 445.
45. See id. at 452.
46. Id. at452n.16.
47. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
48. Barbe, 521 F.3d at 452 n.16 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 452.
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court record de novo. 51 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 199652 (AEDPA), a federal court must apply a two-step analysis to determine
whether the defendant is entitled to habeas relief after a state court has decided
an issue on its merits. 53 The first step requires the court to determine whether one
of the two following situations exists:
(a) the state court adjudication of the issue on its merits "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States"; or (b) the adjudication "resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the
54 facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
Second, if the court finds that one of those two situations exists, it still may only
provide habeas relief "if the error had a 'substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict."' 55 If these two requirements are
satisfied, then the federal court may grant habeas relief.56
Addressing the first step, the Fourth Circuit determined that the trial court's
exclusion of the defense counsel's line of questioning violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Specifically, the trial court's exclusion "amount[ed] to an objectively
unreasonable application of federal law" under the Rock-Lucas Principle. 57
Based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Rock-Lucas
Principle requires state courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
excluding the evidence "'is "arbitrary and disproportionate" to the State's
legitimate interests.' 58 To aid state courts in making these case-by-case
determinations, the Fourth Circuit in Barbe set forth three factors to consider:
"(1) the strength vel non of the state's interests that weigh against admission of
the excluded evidence; (2) the importance of the excluded evidence to the
presentation of an effective defense;
and (3) the scope of the evidence ban being
59
applied against the accused.,
The Fourth Circuit held that the West Virginia state trial court's exclusion of
the defense counsel's questioning amounted to an "objectively unreasonable
application of federal law," thereby satisfying the first step of the AEDPA

51. Id.
52. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104(3), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
53. Barbe, 521 F.3d at 453 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006)).
54. Id. (quoting § 2254(d)).
55. Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 454.
58. Id. at 458 (quoting Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991)).
59. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing White v. Coplan, 399 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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analysis. Based on the state trial court's record, it was unclear if the trial court
had even considered the Rock-Lucas Principle. 61 Failing to consider the RockLucas Principle would have been an "objectively unreasonable a~plication of
federal law" because it is the controlling federal law on the issue. Even if the
trial court had considered the Rock-Lucas Principle, the Fourth Circuit
determined the trial court "applie[d] it unreasonably to the facts. ' 63 Examining
the state court record de novo, the Fourth Circuit noted that the trial court had
excluded per se all questioning of the expert about sexual abuse committed by
other men.65 The trial court's ruling-if the defendant could not meet the falsity
exception, "the rape shield applies, period"-illustrated the per se nature of the
exclusion. 66 This ruling violated the Rock-Lucas
Principle's premise that per se
67
exclusion of such evidence is impermissible.
Next, the Fourth Circuit determined that excluding the evidence in the
defendant's particular case was "disproportionate to the State's [legitimate]
interests." 68 The court reached its determination in light of the three factors it had
set forth to consider. 69 First, the court noted the State's interest in enforcing its
rape shield statute: to "protect[] victims of sexual abuse from needless
harassment, humiliation, and unnecessary invasions of privacy." 70 It also
recognized that such statutes encourage victims of sexual abuse to seek legal
recourse against offenders. 71 Moving to the second factor, the court analyzed the
importance to the defendant's case of allowing cross-examination of the expert
on the possibility that sexual abuse committed by other men caused the victim's
psychological profile. 72 The court determined that allowing such crossexamination was "crucial to [the defendant's] presentation of an effective
defense. '73 The defendant sought to defend himself by showing that the victim
was not credible due to her previous assertions that the defendant had not
sexually abused her. 74 The prosecution offered the expert to boost the victim's
credibility by showing that she had indeed been sexually abused.75 Preventing

60. Id. at 454.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 581 (4th Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
64. See id. at 452.
65. Id. at 458.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 460.
69. See id. at 458-60.
70. Id. at 459 (quoting Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 850 (4th Cir. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.at 459.
75. Id.
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the defendant from cross-examining the expert on other possible causes of the
victim' s psychological profile might lead the jury to infer that only the defendant
could have been the cause. 76 This inference would boost the victim's credibility,
thus "undercut[ting] and effectively scuttl[ing]" the defendant's case. 77 Finally,
the court examined the scope of evidence that the trial court banned.78 The
Fourth Circuit observed that the trial court barred the defendant from inquiring
about sexual abuse by any other men. 79 This effectively prevented the defendant
from introducing any evidence that would "rebut the inference created by the
expert's testimony" that only the defendant could have caused the victim's
psychological profile. 80 Thus, the court determined that the exclusion of the line
of questioning and the effect that it had on Barbe's defense "was
disproportionate to the State's interests in having the [rape shield statute]
applied. 8 1 Therefore, the first requirement of the AEDPA analysis was satisfied
because the trial court was "objectively unreasonable" in its application of the
Rock-Lucas Principle either
by failing to consider it or by applying it
82
unreasonably to the facts.
Turning to the second step of the AEDPA analysis, the court determined that
the state trial court's ruling "had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's
verdict. '' 83 By preventing the defense counsel from questioning the expert on the
effects of other sexual abuse, the jury could infer only that the defendant had
caused the victim's psychological profile and, therefore, the victim was credible
in her allegations against the defendant. 84 The Fourth Circuit decided that the
exclusion and the resulting inference caused "grave doubt" about the injurious
effect that the ruling might have had on the verdict, and because such rave
doubt existed, the court was required to grant habeas relief to the defendant.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit granted the defendant habeas relief because it
found that the trial court's rulings violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront the witnesses against him. 86 Under the Rock-Lucas Principle, the
Confrontation Clause prevents trial courts from establishing a per se rule that

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 454 (quoting Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 581 (4th Cir. 2006)).

83.

Id. at461.

84. Id.
85.

Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that if a court is "in 'grave doubt' concerning the effect of [a

constitutional error on a jury's verdict], the habeas petitioner is entitled to prevail. Id. (quoting
Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir. 2002)). Furthermore, "[s]uch a 'grave doubt' exists
when, in the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced that the reviewing court
finds itself in 'virtual equipose' on the harmlessness issue." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).
86. Id. at 445.
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excludes all questioning of a witness. 87 Instead, trial courts must weigh the three
factors set forth in Barbe to determine whether excluding such questioning
would be "arbitrary or disproportionate to the State's legitimate interests." 88 In
Barbe, the state trial court excluded per se all questioning of sexual abuse by
other men.89 It apparently neither engaged in a Rock-Lucas balancing test nor
considered any of the relevant factors, and even if it did, its ruling was still
flawed. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment violation
entitled Barbe to habeas relief.91
Thomas W. Traxler, Jr.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 458. (citing Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991)).
Id. (quoting Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 454.
Id. at445.
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